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Swaine, Michael D., and Ashley J. Tellis. Interpreting
China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future.
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000. 283pp. $20

Michael Swaine, author of the outstanding
The Military & Political Succession in China
(1992), and his fellow RAND analyst Ashley
Tellis have written a very good book about
Chinese security in both historical and future perspective. It will certainly be of interest to the policy community, as it should be
to all who work on Asian security.
Swaine and Tellis define grand strategy as a
country’s “basic approach to politicalmilitary security.” China’s grand strategy
seeks to preserve domestic order, defend
against external threats, and eventually
attain “geopolitical influence as a major,
and perhaps, primary state.” These bland
objectives become vibrant when viewed
in historical context—many centuries
ago, with strong leadership and domestic
order, China dominated the region not
only, or even primarily, militarily but
also in cultural, political, and economic
ways that elicited deference and reduced
the need for military capability. Subsequent periodic weak leadership and domestic disorder reduced China’s ability
to resist persistent threats from beyond
its long, vulnerable border and diminished its political strength, so China has
been united as a single entity under Chinese rule for only about half of the last
1,800 years. Today, China is pursuing a
pragmatic strategy that emphasizes “the
primacy of internal economic growth
and stability, the nurturing of amicable
international relations, the relative restraint in the use of force combined with
increasing efforts to create a more modern military, and the continued search
for asymmetric gains internationally”
(e.g., entrance into the World Trade
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Organization as a developing, rather than
developed, economy). Assuming that no
catastrophic revisions of this strategy are
forced on China, Swaine and Tellis expect it to continue through 2015–2020,
which they identify as the minimal time
frame in which the Chinese economy and
military might develop sufficiently to allow China to become globally preeminent. If this strategy is not derailed (and
that is a major if), Swaine and Tellis argue, there are three plausible long-term
scenarios: that China becomes domestically chaotic, internationally cooperative,
or internationally assertive, perhaps to the
point of global preeminence. Where the
United States is the hegemon today and
for the foreseeable future, China may seek
to be the hegemon some decades hence.
Swaine and Tellis focus on hegemony
based on economic and military power.
However, as China may know from its
earlier experience as a hegemon in East
Asia, there is more to it than economic
and military power. The United States
became hegemonic in the West after
World War II, when it possessed both
economic and military power, and an attractive liberal ideology that provided
profound economic and social benefits.
It led a coalition against a militarily powerful, ideologically expansionist Soviet
Union; when the Soviet Union collapsed,
in part because its ideology was not functional in practice and its empire was held
together by force, the United States
found itself with a global stature of nearly
hegemonic scope. Since 1991, U.S. ideology has reduced the opposition by other
countries against the United States that
might have been expected had the order
it represents relied on military and economic power alone. While many voices,
some in Mandarin, complain about U.S.
hegemony, it provides a robust and
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functional order in which states like
China can develop in reasonable peace.
Though it may not want to acknowledge
the fact, China benefits from the hegemony of U.S. order, and from its enforcement by American naval and air
power.
Unlike the United States after World War
II, China does not appear to offer a globally compelling ideology; in the absence
of such an ideology, increasing Chinese
power and assertiveness may frighten
countries to resist China by generating
power internally or externally. Internal
power might take the form of developing
nuclear weapons. Most likely, external
balancing would take the form of intensified ties with the United States, though
Taiwan, Vietnam, and India all might
have reasons to become better acquainted
with each other; even a weak Russia
might contribute to a China-constraining
coalition. Increases in Chinese power—if
only for defensive purposes, like looking
after China’s energy interests abroad—
might lead to resistance, because no
country could be sure that Chinese intentions would not change. Counterbalancing
would likely become more intense if
China were to seek to move from regional
hegemony to “geopolitical preeminence
on a global scale.” The absence of an adequate consideration of such “balancing”
may be the most significant weakness in
this book. However, this is an impressive
study of China’s grand strategy, and it is
worthy of serious examination.
CARMEL DAVIS

University of Pennsylvania
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Woolley, Peter J. Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1999. 166pp. $49.95

In 1971 James Auer published The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime
Forces, 1945–1971, “a book that [was]
meant to challenge certain assumptions
surrounding post–World War II Japan
and its military, in particular its maritime
forces.” Thirty years later, in post–Cold
War Japan, some of those same suppositions persist. Of particular note, beliefs
that Japanese rearmament is an American initiative, that Japan seeks only to
provide for its own internal security
while the United States is responsible for
all external threats, and that militarism is
returning to Japan, result in conflicts
within Japan and among its Asian
neighbors.
To many, the U.S.-Japan alliance both
protects Japanese security interests and
provides the cork that keeps Japanese
militarism in the bottle. To students of
Asia, the alliance follows a natural evolution resulting from the congruence of interests of two maritime nations as Japan
reasserts its regional influence. To the
prescient, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the
bedrock for stability in a region rife with
competing interests, developing conflicts,
and unresolved animosities.
Peter Woolley, a professor of comparative
politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University,
has studied and written extensively on
Japanese maritime development. He has
written the next volume in this continuing story of Japan’s defense-system evolution, masterfully picking up where
Auer left off. Woolley provides a concise
analysis of the Japanese Defense Forces’
role in a world awakening to the transitional peace of the post–Cold War era.
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